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long been known as a man of thorough philosophical training, wide knowledge, and very active mind. Those who read English will deeply regret that the author saw fit to write his work in French. It is the most masterly analysis and criticism that modern pragmatism has yet had. We regret that we are unable to devote more space to it and to give a more adequate review of it here. In the first part, the author takes up pragmatism and its relations to intellectualism, discussing its principles in general. A special chapter is given to Dewey. In the second part, entitled "Pragmatism and Modernism", the author shows the social phenomena that explain the principles of such a philosophy, and then considers the pragmatism of the Middle Ages and modern scholasticism. Scholastic metaphysics was the pragmatism of the Middle Age, and pragmatism is modern scholasticism. Not only scholasticism, but the pragmatism of Kant, the author deems indefinitely superior to that of James and Schiller. In one chapter, Dr. Schinz discusses the question whether James is a pragmatist or not; and leaves the reader to infer that neither James nor he himself is able to determine. In appendices, the author discusses the common sensations and philosophy, and the relations between literature and the moral code.

What is Pragmatism? by JAMES BISSETT PRATT. The Macmillan Co., New York, 1909. 256 p.

We have here six lectures given last summer at the Glenmore Summer School before an audience, if we understand the writer, of hardly more than half a dozen people, and the rest of the world is here compensated for its loss by being given these lectures in due form. No two writers have the same conception of pragmatism, and this makes it an admirable topic for those in our day who have a strong scholastic bent. The author tells at the outset of a law professor who discussed the question, whether the individual really owned his land or whether the state, which could exercise its right of eminent domain or could condemn it, was the party in whom ownership really vested. Pragmatism would say this was no problem at all, because ownership consists in enumerating the things the so-called owner can do. Pragmatism asks about everything what it means for me, for a thing is what it does. Meaning is influencing practice. Truth is what is useful or works well. Idea is a synonym for a plan of action. This is what Schiller calls humanism. It is the pet child of epistemology and gives speculators of this ilk a new and fascinating ambiguity to charge up against truth. Just as no pragmatists agree, so no two critics of it agree, and it is rather curious to see two books that have simultaneously appeared both disputing its claims, viz., Pratt and Schinz, taking almost diametrically opposite views of it. For himself, the writer confesses, that after having read much and, alas! written several papers concerning pragmatism, he is obliged to confess that there is such an incommensurability between it and the writer's mind that neither finds anything in the other.

Psychotherapy, by Hugo Münsterberg. Moffat, Yard & Co., New York, 1909. 398 p.

This is second in the series of books the author is writing to discuss for the wider public the practical applications of modern psychology. He promises others on sex, social problems, commerce, industry, etc. He tells us he has chosen "the form of loose popular essays;" and yet in the next sentence tells us there is too much loose talk afloat about psychotherapy. We are told that he has a personal right to deal with these questions because he studied medicine and holds the degree of M. D., and also gave the first university course on hypnotism in

the world, and since then "has never ceased to work psychothera-peutically." He has helped "many hundreds" and "no one ever had to pay anything." At the outset, we are given the psychological basis of psychotherapy, including the aim of psychology, mind and brain psychology in medicine, suggestion and hypnotism, psychology of the subconscious. The author develops his philosophical notion of a radical difference between the causal series of events which doctors chiefly concern themselves with, and the purposive series. In part II, he discusses the practical work of psychotherapy: its fields, general and special methods, mental and bodily symptoms. In the third, the place of psychotherapy, viz.: its relations to the church, the physician and the community. Barring the commingling of philosophical and scientific psychology, so characteristic of Harvard, especially protesting against the ever intrusive distinctions between causal and purposive, and the reiterated foible of the author that there is no subconscious or no unconscious, the book is on the whole a broad-minded and very sensible popular presentation of the subject. We confess, however, to some disappointment, after the many allusions in the past to this author's work, that the clinical cases he publishes are not richer, more numerous, and that some of them are so very fragmentary. Despite its defects and perhaps especially its diffusion, which it is very tempting to enlarge upon, its merits far preponderate; and it is on the whole the best popular presentation the subject has ever had in English up to date.

The Emmanuel Movement in a New England Town, by LYMAN P. POWELL. G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1909. 188 p.

This is the third in a trilogy of books by this author within two years, the first entitled, "Christian Science;" the second, "The Art of Natural Sleep." The present shows the possibilities of the Emmanuel Movement as applied to a wide range of nervous functional disorders in the town of Northampton, and indicates the wider range to which the movement is destined to re-energize the whole church. The chapters are: What the Emmanuel Movement is; the Clinic in a College Town; a Year's Results; the Treatment of the Nerves; the Queer One in the House; the Cure of the Alcoholic; the Miscellaneous Cases; the Movement and the Church.

Letters on Psychotherapeutics, by Prof. H. Oppenheim. Translated by Alexander Bruce. Otto Schulze & Co., Edinburgh, and G. E. Stechert, New York, 1907. 60 p.

Here we have a number of interesting letters to various patients, some of whom have been eminent. There is certainly great sagacity shown.

The Proceedings of the Society for Psychical Research for Feb., 1909, contain an article by Sage on the Alleged Miraculous Hailstones of Remiremont, and two on D. D. Home by Count Petrovo Solovovo and Miss Alice Johnson, the former arguing against his employment of suggestion to produce illusions and hallucinations in his sitters, and the latter for this hypothesis. Miss Johnson's thesis is, in brief, that Home put most of his sitters through an educative process by which he made them highly suggestible, and she cites various instances, showing especially how he gradually worked up to his famous levitation feat of floating out of one window and in at another, eight feet above the ground. Count Petrovo Solovovo cites cases in which he thinks the proof is plain that the phenomena were objective at least, though they might have been produced by trickery, and he argues that since there was no hallucination in these cases there could have